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Monday, August 3, 2020 | History

2 edition of Optimal and majority-voting equilibrium levels of social security found in the catalog.

Optimal and majority-voting equilibrium levels of social security

Sheng Cheng Hu

Optimal and majority-voting equilibrium levels of social security

by Sheng Cheng Hu

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  • 16 Currently reading

Published by Social Security Administration, Office of Policy, Office of Research and Statistics in Washington .
Written in English

    Subjects:
  • Social security -- Mathematical models -- United States.,
  • Voting research -- United States.

  • Edition Notes

    StatementSheng Cheng Hu.
    SeriesORS working paper series -- no. 13
    ContributionsUnited States. Social Security Administration. Office of Research and Statistics.
    The Physical Object
    Pagination35 p. ;
    Number of Pages35
    ID Numbers
    Open LibraryOL16568574M

    Social Security as a Means for Efficient Risk Sharing Q(t) = A(t)[Z(t - l)]e(t)[L(t)]l-e(f), where Q(t) is aggregate output produced at time t of the single good which can be used either as a capital good or for consumption; Z(t - 1) is the amount of capital which must be put in place at time (t - 1) in order to be used in production at time t; L(t) is the aggregate amount of labor used. Determining when to claim your Social Security benefits is not only an important decision, but also a complicated one for most people. Because the Social Security program is designed to handle many different situations, the regulations covering who can get which benefits and at .

    A Real-Life Example of the Social Security Income Limit in Action. To put these numbers into context, let’s look at an example of how this might work in a real-life scenario: Rosie is 64 years old. She started taking Social Security benefits as soon as she turned . Published: Krueger, Dirk & Ludwig, Alexander, "On the optimal provision of social insurance: Progressive taxation versus education subsidies in general equilibrium," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages citation courtesy of. Users who downloaded this paper also downloaded* these.

    This book presents an original exposition of general equilibrium theory for advanced undergraduate and graduate-level students of economics. It contains detailed discussions of economic efficiency, competitive equilibrium, the first andsecond welfare theorems, the Kuhn-Tucker approach to general equilibrium, the Arrow-Debreu model, and rational. Optimal Taxation --Two Fallacies of Optimal Summary -- Key Concepts -- Questions and Problems -- Social Insurance -- The Social Security System -- Social Security, Private Insurance, and Market Failures -- High Transactions Costs -- Risk Mitigation -- Lack of Indexing: The Inability of Private Markets to Insure Social Risks -- Adverse.


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Optimal and majority-voting equilibrium levels of social security by Sheng Cheng Hu Download PDF EPUB FB2

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Optimal and Majority-Voting Equilibrium Levels of Social Security Author: Sheng Cheng Hu. Title: Optimal and Majority-Voting Equilibrium Levels of Social Security Author: Sheng Cheng Hu Created Date: Z.

Optimal and Majority-Voting Equilibrium Levels of Social Security. In all these works, the level of social security is assumed to be exogenous although it is often determined in the real world by the desire of the majority of voters and thus is an endogenous variable of the economic system.

While Browning [] and Hu [] did consider. For the sake of an easier comparison, we list the ratio of young-age consumption to output, the saving rate and the fertility rate in the equilibrium solution without social security and the socially optimal solution in Table reason for the difference between the social planner's solution and the competitive solutions is as by: A majority voting equilibrium is shown to exist in which the median voter is liquidity-constrained.

which votes for a positive level of social security. This level depends on the difference Author: Jorge Soares. Social Security. On the other hand, there are many other models in the political economic theory of Social Security in which majority voting equilibrium is applied.

In all these cases, the retirement age is always considered as an exogenously given parameter and people simply accept it. Here the majority-voting equilibrium is. However, there's a Social Security family maximum of % to % of the worker's benefit, and if all qualifying family members exceed this limit, each person's benefit is.

1. Introduction. Social security systems exist in all developed economies and, moreover, represent in most of them the largest public program. The demographic trends in all these economies lead to a decreasing dependency ratio and are viewed as a sign of a looming crisis of public pension systems, raising doubts about future solvency of the existing programs and bringing the social security.

Downloadable. Americans face the challenges of retirement with varying degrees of preparation. Evidence indicates that that many individuals may not be making the best possible choices with respect to their Social Security and retirement savings. We assess the subjective expectations of non-retirees and find that they have sizable biases and uncertainty about future retirement benefits.

This book presents an original exposition of general equilibrium theory for advanced undergraduate and graduate-level students of economics. It contains detailed discussions of economic efficiency, competitive equilibrium, the first and second welfare theorems, the Kuhn-Tucker approach to general equilibrium, the Arrow-Debreu model, and rational expectations equilibrium and the permanent.

Forni () shows that, in such an environment, an equilibrium may exist for certain parameter values in which the median voter supports strictly positive social security taxes if she anticipates. an optimal allocation of society's resources.

an underallocation of resources to this product. an overallocation of resources to this product. a higher price than is consistent with an optimal allocation of resources.

Answer: C. Socially optimal is where P = MC and profit is maximised. This is the optimal distribution of resources in society, taking into account all external costs and benefits as well as internal costs and benefits.

Social Efficiency occurs at an output where Marginal Social Benefit (MSB) = Marginal Social. "A Positive Theory of Social Security Based on Reputation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol.

(1), pagesFebruary. Martin Feldstein, "The Optimal Level of Social Security Benefits," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford. b) However, as show in the next box, the welfare maximizing level (Q* @ MSB = MSC) at 3 gardeners c) Under Lindahl, pricing Q* is chosen and each voter is charger their WTP for that level of output.

The result will differ from the political equilibrium under majority voting with equal tax shares in two ways. A concise but rigorous and thorough introduction to modern macroeconomic theory. This book offers an introduction to modern macroeconomic theory. It is concise but rigorous and broad, covering all major areas in mainstream macroeconomics today and showing how macroeconomic models build on and relate to each other.

The self-contained text begins with models of individual decision makers. This book presents an original exposition of general equilibrium theory for advanced undergraduate and graduate-level students of economics.

It contains detailed discussions of economic efficiency, competitive equilibrium, the first and second welfare theorems, the Kuhn–Tucker approach to general equilibrium, the Arrow–Debreu model, and rational expectations equilibrium and the permanent.

For that purpose, a general equilibrium model is used that allows for an endogenous analysis of decisionmaking on government policies. We concentrate here on the effects of an aging population on expenditures and levels of social security benefits, the provision of public goods and services, the private output and intergenerational conflicts.

the baseline economy is calibrated to obtain the current level of the U.S. social security tax rate as an equilibrium outcome of the political process.

This allows us to extend the calibration to an additional parameter, the coefficient of relative risk aversion. In this model, the social security system is. Ultimately, the optimal tax rate equilibrium – or really, two equilibria for both ordinary income and long-term capital gains – will vary by the retiree, depending on his/her income sources and when they begin (e.g., Social Security and pensions), overall wealth, and projected spending (that determines whether wealth in the aggregate will.

the context of majority voting in overlapping generations models. Azariadis and Galasso (), Galasso (), Cooley and Soares () show that equilibria exist in which so-cial security emerges through a majority voting mechanism.

Boldrin and Rustichini () show that “a PAYGO public pension plan is a subgame perfect equilibrium of a major.Social Security Beneficiaries Social Security Administration. According to Robert M. Ball, a past Commissioner of Social Security, the Social Security Program is “social insurance” designed to help people “when earnings stop because one is too old to work or too disabled to work, or because the wage earner in the family dies, or because there is no job to be had, or when there are.The determination of social security benefits and contribution rates is often studied in majority voting models.

This approach was initiated by Browning (), who considers a society where people differ only according to age. Within that framework, the decisive voter is the median age individual. The voting equilibrium then leads to an.